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The Inductive Route Towards Necessity
Abstract:  It is generally assumed that relations of necessity cannot be known by
induction on experience. In this paper, I propose a notion of situated possibilities,
weaker  than  nomic  possibilities,  that  is  compatible  with  an  inductivist
epistemology  for  modalities.  I  show  that  assuming  this  notion,  not  only  can
relations of necessity be known by induction on our experience, but such relations
cannot  be  any more  underdetermined by experience than universal  regularities.
This means that any one believing in a universal regularity is as well warranted to
believe in the corresponding relation of necessity. 
We seem to know a great deal about what is possible or not in this world. For example, I
know that glass is fragile, and that if I had let a glass vase fall from my window, it would have
broken. I also know, from my physics classes, that it would have accelerated at about 9 .8 m∕s2:
in such normal conditions, an object in free fall couldn’t accelerate at a much lower or higher
rate. All this, it seems, is common knowledge that came to be known by experience (mine or
others), not by merely reflecting on the meaning of words… Thus modal knowledge is very
mundane. But it poses an epistemological challenge: how could we know, from our experience,
anything about unrealized possibilities? 
In this paper, I am interested in a more specific question: can relations of necessity (what is
true of all possibilities) be known by mere induction? 
Induction  is  an  ampliative  mode  of  inference  by  which  one  infers,  from a  sample  of
exemplars of a given type displaying a regularity, that this regularity holds for a larger set: the
set  of  all  objects of  this  type.  The received view is that  induction on actual  experiences is
insufficient to justify relations of necessity. It can only justify universal generalisation. As a
consequence,  empiricist-minded  philosophers  tend  to  be  sceptical  about  natural  modalities,
which they consider too metaphysical, while optimists about modalities tend to accept in their
epistemology ampliative modes of inference that go beyond induction, typically, inference to the
best explanation. 
In this paper,  I  wish to challenge this received view by proposing a notion of situated
possibility that, if we accept it, allows for justifying relations of necessity by induction. I also
wish to show that for all practical purposes, such relations of necessity are no more, no less
justified than a  corresponding universal  generalisation,  so that  (accepting my framework) it
would be irrational to accept the latter while rejecting the former. 
The consequence of this is that empiricist-minded philosophers who are sceptical about
modes of inference that go beyond induction have at their disposal a framework within which
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they can make room for modalities, while modal realists can defend their views in an empiricist-
friendly way. This, I think, makes both position less uncomfortable. 
My arguments assume from the start that there are possibilities of the kind considered in
nature, and an empiricist might still be reluctant to accept this. Although I will give few reasons
to accept them in passing, the purpose of the paper is not to argue for the existence of situated
possibilities.  However,  it  defuses  one  of  the  main  arguments  to  reject  them:  their  alleged
principled unknowability. 
Note that there has been a resurgence of empiricist epistemology for modalities in recent
years.  Some  authors  have  argued  in  favour  of  the  idea  that  knowledge  of  metaphysical
possibilities  is  attainable  by  induction  on  experience  (Roca-Royes, 201  7  ;  Hawke,  2011,  ch.  
4.2.3; Strohminger, 2015).  I  am sympathetic to these accounts,  and mine shares similarities.
However it differs in its focus on natural modalities rather than metaphysical ones, which makes
it more modest in this respect. It is also more ambitious in other respects, because I aim to show
that  one  can  have  knowledge  not  only  of  possibilities,  but  of  relations  of  necessity  from
experience, and that they are as well-justified as universal regularities. 
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 1 Induction and Underdetermination
I will assume that induction is a valid mode of inference, in the following weak sense:
given that a sample of experienced situations of a given type gives us some regularity, we have
prima  facie  good  reasons  to  believe  that  this  regularity  can  be  extended  to  the  set  of  all
situations of the same type, so long as no relevant conflicting statement that we have knowledge
of is equally justified. Hence it is often reasonable to believe statements of universal regularity.
(I cast general statements in terms of experienced situations for the sake of generality, assuming
that a statement like “all swans are white” can be translated into “all situations where there is
one  swan  are  situations  where  there  is  one  white  swan”–the  notion  of  situation  will  be
developed in the next section.) I do not claim that such beliefs cannot be defeated by more
evidence, only that it is reasonable to believe them as long as no evidence to the contrary is at
our  disposal,  and  as  long  as  they  are  not  in  competition  with  other  equally  well-justified
statements. 
The clause about competing statements is important because in principle, we could have
conflicting statements that are both justified by induction. For example, an induction on gold
spheres could tell us that they are stable whatever their size, and an induction on metal spheres
in general could tell us that they become unstable past a given size. Since gold is a metal, these
two results are in conflict. They are contrastively underdetermined by evidence. I would say that
we should suspend our judgment in such a case and wait for more evidence. But I would say
that there is no such problem in the case of statements that have no known serious competitors. 
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It might be hard to tell what counts as a serious competitor. One might worry that there’s
always a possibility of coming up with an inductively justified statement in conflict with any
statement, even if it is far-fetched. This problem is somehow related to Goodman (1954)’s new
riddle of induction: why wouldn’t the predicate blite, meaning “white before t and black after t”
be  valid  for  inductive  reasoning?  Then “all  swans  are  white”  would  be  as  justified  as  the
incompatible “all swans are blite”. 
There are other sceptical arguments against induction, tracing back to Hume at least, that
induction rests on the postulate that nature is uniform, which cannot be justified by deduction
(because we need an ampliative inference) nor by induction (because it would be circular). 
All  the  worries  about  induction  can  actually  be  reframed  as  problems  of  contrastive
underdetermination.  Hume’s  scepticism,  for  example,  could  be  framed,  taking  the  case  of
swans, as resulting from an underdetermination between the statements “all swans are white”
and “all swans are white until now and non-white from now”: both are compatible with the
same  evidence,  so  we  cannot  have  any  justification  for  one  or  the  other  without  adding
presuppositions. 
This issue has been turned by some authors into a  reductio  against  the kind of sceptic
epistemology that would warrant induction but refrain from accepting more ambitious modes of
inference, such as inference to the best explanation: if all ampliative modes of inference suffer
from a problem of underdetermination, why set the bar at one place rather than another? Why
not be more ambitious? This has been mounted as a defence of modal knowledge, assuming that
such knowledge is arrived at by inference to the best explanation (Ladyman and Ross, 2007, ch.
2.3). 
Addressing  these  debates  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  paper  (see
Williams, 1963; Stove, 1986; Campbell, 2001; Wright, 2018, for defences of induction). I  will
simply assume that some statements are justified by induction while others, including “all swans
are blite”, are not, and I will talk of underdetermination only when two justified statements are
in conflict.  Like  Ladyman and Ross,  my focus is  on modalities,  but  my defence of  modal
knowledge will take a different route. I do not wish to argue that modal sceptics place the bar at
a wrong position. I wish to argue that at least for one kind of alethic modality (the one that I will
present  in  the  next  section),  wherever  one  places  the  bar  in  these  matters,  universal
generalisations and relations of necessity will  fall  on the same side of it:  given a universal
generalisation of the type “all A are B” and its modal counterpart “necessarily, all A are B”,
either both are underdetermined by evidence, or neither are. 
This seems counter-intuitive, because modal statements are strictly stronger than their non-
modal counterparts. My main argument is that although one statement is indeed stronger, that
cannot make any pragmatic difference concerning what it is rational to believe or not, so that for
all pragmatic purposes, they will always fall on the same side of underdetermination (or to be
precise, one cannot be in a position to know that one of the statements is underdetermined but
not  the  other).  I  think  this  follows  at  least  if  one  assumes,  as  a  minimal  metaphysical
requirement, that there are situated possibilities in the world, of a kind to be detailed in the next
section. 
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 2 Situated Possibilities
Imagine a scientist wants to test the laws of classical optics. She aims a laser towards a
reflecting surface from a particular angle and observes that the light  ray is  reflected by the
surface at the same angle. I will call this a situation. 
A situation is a local, bounded, occurrent state of affairs that one can experience. It can be
delimited arbitrarily in space and time, as well as in terms of relevant properties and levels of
precision, depending on our interests, but once this is done, it has objective characteristics (such
as relative positions of objects) that are accessible to us, human beings. We describe a situation
using  our  language,  possibly  using  theoretical  language,  for  example  values  for  measured
properties in a scientific context. This allows us to classify situations into types, corresponding,
for example, to the kinds of objects they contain and to the way they are related to the rest of the
universe, and to assign a state to them, corresponding to definite properties and relations for the
objects  they  contain.  I  assume  that  the  vocabulary  we  use  to  characterise  situations  is
projectible, in the sense of Goodman. 
It  is  conceivable  that  any  given  situation  had  been  different.  By this,  I  mean that  the
situation, to which we refer rigidly, could have been in a different state, that it could have had
different accessible properties, while still being the same situation of the same type (with the
same objects). The modality involved so far is conceptual (nearly logical), and not alethic: this
is something we can imagine without contradiction. I assume that we know a priori the range of
conceivable properties any given situation of a certain type could have. In the example above,
given the way our situation is characterised, this would be the finite set of angles with which the
laser  could have aimed towards the  surface,  given the finite  precision of  our  apparatus  for
measuring angles,  and the finite set  of  angles at  which the ray could be reflected.  To take
another example, if we have a thermometer capable of measuring the temperature of a liquid
from 0 to 200 degrees with a precision of 1 degree, and if we put this thermometer into water in
normal conditions, then any outcome in this range is a priori conceivable (even though, as we
know, some outcomes are naturally impossible because water evaporates at 100 degrees). In
physics, the range of conceivable possibilities would be typically represented by partitions of
phase-space,  or,  for  systems  extended  in  time,  by  families  of  histories  corresponding  to
conceivable measurement outcomes for degrees of freedom of the system. In more mundane
contexts, we could simply enumerate these possibilities. I will refer to each of these possibilities
as a conceivable situation. 
Let me emphasise that conceivable situations are not conceived in abstracto, but are, so to
speak, anchored to an actual situation of reference. We are not imagining any random reflecting
surface and any laser pointing towards it anywhere and at any time, but  this very reflecting
surface and this very laser at this place and time, albeit at different angles. 
It  is  common  to  think  of  natural  (or  nomic)  possibilities  as  a  sub-set  of  conceivable
possibilities: only part of what can be conceived is naturally possible. In our example, if the
laws of classical optics apply, the ray will be reflected at the same angle as the incident angle,
and all  other conceivable results  are naturally impossible.  For probabilistic theories such as
statistical mechanics or quantum mechanics, there might be more than one possibility, and I
assume that this is the general case. 
I will  refer  to this sub-set  of  possibilities as the set  of  possible situations.  Just as their
conceivable counterparts, possible situations are anchored to a situation of reference: one could
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formalise them as a S5 modal system centred on an actual situation, limited to the objects in this
situation. 
Possible situations are not  possible worlds.  My focus on possible situations rather than
possible worlds shares some motivations with situation semantics in philosophy of language.
(Barwise and Perry, 1983; Kratzer, 2008) To be precise, possible situations differ from possible
worlds in two important respects: 
Extensional limitation: 
Conceivable and possible situations are not maximal states of affairs, they are bounded in 
space and time, they contain a finite set of objects, they are identified by a coarse-grained 
type depending on our discrimination abilities and selective interests. 
Intensional limitation: 
As a direct consequence of extensional limitation, the range of possibilities for a situation
is also limited: it could depend on environmental constraints (the rest of the universe is 
considered fixed) and it also depends on our discrimination abilities and interests (an 
epistemic agent can be “blind”, voluntarily or not, to some counterfactual variations).
These limitations are meant to ensure the compatibility of the present approach with an
empiricist epistemology: they exclude from our range of alternative possibilities the ones that
differ in the posited unobservable or metaphysical characteristics of the situation. They will also
play a role in the arguments to follow. 
In this paper, I will assume that possible situations exist. I don’t want this assumption to be
metaphysically loaded: I do not claim that possible situations are concrete entities, or that they
represent dispositions or relations between universals. All I assume is that there are alternative
ways actual situations could be, and alternative ways they couldn’t be in virtue of natural and
environmental  constraints.  I  assume that  it  is  a matter  of  empirical  inquiry to know which,
among the conceivable situations, are naturally possible and which are not, and the purpose of
this paper is to show that such knowledge is attainable by induction on realized possibilities.
Such knowledge will take the form of necessary statements that characterise all the possible
situations of a certain type, and these alone (this time without extensional limitation). 
Given  the  intensional  limitations  mentioned  above,  the  kind  of  necessity  at  stake  is
presumably weaker than nomic (hence metaphysical) necessity: there could be limitations to the
types of situations to which we have access given our epistemic position and discrimination
abilities, so what we have is necessity of a relative kind, in the same way technical modalities
are relative to our technical abilities. In the rest of this paper, I will refer to this kind of necessity
as weak necessity. My aim is not to show that we could have access to metaphysical essence, let
alone to the fundamental “modal structure of the world”, as structural realists would have it
(French, 2014; Ladyman and Ross, 2007), but only that we have access to weak necessity.
However, in contrast with the way modalities are generally considered by empiricists, I am
talking about objective, alethic possibilities: not mere heuristic or fictional devices, not known a
priori, not degrees of credence or other mind-dependent entities, but possibilities in the world.
 3 Why Should We Accept Situated Possibilities?
The purpose of this paper is  not  to show that situated possibilities of this kind exist in
nature. It is only to show that if they exist, we can have knowledge of them. Arguably, the
assumption that they exist to start  with, which has more metaphysical  overtones,  should be
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justified independently. I think that the main reasons to accept it are semantic and pragmatic,
and these reasons are empiricist-friendly. There is not enough space to develop these reasons in
full detail, but let me give a brief overview. 
On the semantic side, modal discourse is ubiquitous in natural languages, and in science as
well,  and  denying  meaningfulness  to  whole  parts  of  our  discourse  looks  like  a  dogmatic
position.  This is  particularly true for empiricists,  like  van Fraassen (1980), who claim to be
semantic  realists:  most  arguments  in  favour  of  semantic  realism  or  against  verificationist
theories  of  meaning  involve  modalities,  such  as  the  problematic  reduction  of  dispositional
terms, or Kripke’s modal argument. As far as I can see, a principled impossibility for modal
knowledge is the main reason to assume that modal statements have no truth-value, but the aim
of this  article  is  to  show that  this  reason is  not  tenable  in  the  case  of  situated  modalities.
Moreover, situated modalities are well suited to account for modal discourse, since in general,
counterfactual statements are not maximal and are, so to speak, “anchored” to particular objects
to which we refer directly (as in Kripke (1980)’s examples–see also Kratzer (2008)). 
Pragmatically, accepting modalities can help make sense of scientific practice as a rational
activity. Scientists often implement experimental  situations that  would not occur if not with
their interventions, or they vary parameters as if they were exploring various possibilities. This
makes sense if their motivation is to know what would happen in such situations, implying that
gaining modal knowledge must be part of the aim of science (Ladyman and Ross, 2007, p. 110).
Of course, once the situations are implemented, they become actual and not merely possible.
But the point is to account for their motivation prior to the implementation, or what they take
the situation that they will implement to be representative of. What are they after when they
create a configuration that would not occur if not with their intervention? I think the best way to
make sense of their motivation is to assume that they take the situations they implement to be
representative  of  mere  possibilities.  Similarly,  the  fact  that  all  implemented  situations  are
eventually  actually observed  does not mean that scientific knowledge is restricted to what is
actually  observed:  implemented  situations  are  taken  to  be  representative  of  all  unobserved
situations of the same type. 
Situated possibilities are also particularly well-suited to account for this pragmatic aspect in
a minimal way, because the situations scientists implement are not maximal states of affairs. 
This is not the place to develop these aspects further, and I will ask the reader to accept, for
the sake of the argument, that there are situated possibilities of the kind described here in the
world, that is, that there is a fact of the matter about whether the situations we encounter could
have been different in one way or another, all else being equal, in virtue of external constraints
on what we could experience. 
 4 The Inductive Route Towards (Weak) Necessity
Here for the preliminaries. Let us now turn to the main question of this article: can at least
some relations of necessity be known by induction? 
The received view,  as  far  as  I  know,  is  that  they cannot,  whatever  the  kind of  alethic
necessity considered. Here is a short rationale that bolsters this view. Induction is an ampliative
mode of inference by which one infers, from a sample of exemplars of a given type displaying a
regularity, that this regularity holds for a larger set: the set of all objects of this type. Hence what
can be known by induction is a universal regularity. But a relation of necessity goes beyond that.
It  does  not  only  concern  the  actual  world,  but  all  possible  worlds.  However,  we  have  no
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epistemic  access  to  other  possible  worlds  (no  “modal  telescope”);  we  do  not  experience
relations of necessity or mere possibilities; possible worlds, if they exist as such, are causally
disconnected from the actual world. An induction on possible worlds will not do: with only one
exemplar at our disposal, the induction cannot get started. 
If one accepts this rationale, there are two options. 
The first option is to be a modal sceptic, and assume, for example, that modal talk is a mere
pragmatic way of speaking that does not purport to be true or false (van Fraassen, 1989), or
perhaps that modal talk is meaningful, but generally false. Taking the case of nomic necessity,
one can deny that there are such things as laws of nature (which is van Fraassen’s view), or one
can assume that laws of nature supervene on non-modal facts, as in the best system approach
(Lewis, 1973, pp. 73–77). Then laws of nature might be knowable by induction, but they have
no “modal force”: they merely summarise the regularities of the actual world. I have explained
in the previous section why I think this modal-sceptic option is unsatisfactory. 
The second option is  to  accept  that  there  are other modes of inference than induction,
typically, inference to the best explanation.  As far as I know, this is the option followed by all
philosophers who assume that laws of nature have a “modal force”, and do not supervene on
non-modal  facts:  they  assume  that  these  laws  play  an  explanatory  role,  and  that  they  are
justified as such. The rationale can be the following: one sees some regularity in a sample of
phenomena: all Fs in the sample are Gs; the best explanation of this observed regularity is that
as a matter of nomic necessity (i.e. as a consequence of the laws of nature), all possible Fs are
Gs; from this one can infer that all actual, past, present and future Fs are Gs, but one did not
arrive  at  this  result  by  induction:  it  was  arrived  at  by  inference  to  the  best  explanation.
(Dretske, 1977; Armstrong, 1983; Foster, 1982) 
The problem with this second option is its use of inference to the best explanation as a
principle  of  justification.  Empiricists  typically  deny  that  the  non-empirical  criteria  that  are
constitutive of a good explanation, such as simplicity, are truth-conducive (this idea could be
threatened  by  a  Dutch  Book  argument  (van  Fraassen, 1989,  ch.  6)).  Inference  to  the  best
explanation is certainly used in science and in everyday life. It could be a heuristic device to
formulate new hypotheses (which is actually how Peirce, who introduced the concept under the
term “abduction”, viewed it (Nyrup, 2015)), or a strategic device to decide which hypotheses to
consider  as  a  priority.  But  from an  empiricist  perspective,  this  tells  us  nothing  about  their
validity: these hypotheses should then be put to the test so as to ensure that they are empirically
adequate, and the justification of their empirical adequacy can, at best, be inductive. 
Hence our two options are problematic. However I think we are facing a false dilemma: we
do not have to choose between the truth-conduciveness of inference to the best explanation and
modal  scepticism;  the  received  view  is  wrong:  one  can  have  knowledge  of  necessity  by
induction alone, at least when it comes to the weak necessity considered here.
This is because the possibilities we are considering, contrarily to nomic or metaphysical
possibilities, are situated: one should think of them not in terms of possible worlds, but in terms
of possible situations. Then all that is required to justify a claim of necessity by induction is to
assume that the situations we experience are a representative sample of the larger set of possible
situations of the same type. As an example, one take the observation that all objects released at
the surface of earth accelerate towards the ground at a certain rate and infer that this is true of all
possible situations of the same type, i.e. that it is true as a matter of necessity, at least relative to
some  background  conditions  (intensional  limitations)  that  happen  to  be  present  in  our
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surrounding  environment.  This  means  that  one  is  in  a  position  to  assign  truth-value  to
counterfactual statements such as “if I released this object, it would fall towards the earth”. 
An induction on possible worlds would of course be problematic, since our sample would
consist in only one exemplar. If possible situations are construed as alternatives to actual ones,
an induction on the alternatives to a single situation would be problematic as well, for the very
same reason. But this is not so with an induction on all possible alternatives to all situations, at
all places and times in the universe, assuming that observed situations are representative not
only of all  other unobserved actual  situations  of the  same type,  but  also of all  unobserved
alternatives to all other situations of the same type in the universe. In this sense, the actual fall
of a released object can be considered representative of the counterfactual fall of an object that
was not actually released (assuming this object  could have been released, which can also be
known by induction on objects of this type). (Note that this account is not very different, in
spirit, from Roca-Royes (201  7  )’s similarity-based epistemology for de re modalities.) This kind
of induction is defeasible. New evidence might prove a relation of necessity wrong. But the
same goes for any kind of induction. 
This  approach  can  be  qualified,  in  Hale (2003)’s  terminology,  as  a  possibility-first
approach:  the idea is  that  knowledge of a given class of possibilities,  and in particular,  the
absence of some relevant possibilities in this class, informs us about relations of necessity. Here,
the relevant class of possibilities is the class of realized possibilities (note that Hale explicitly
rejects this option, but (i) he does not discuss inductive reasoning in his paper, and (ii) he is
mainly concerned with knowledge of metaphysical modalities, and assumes, wrongly I think,
that knowledge of weaker modalities must derive from it). 
The assumption that observed situations are representative of possible situations is not itself
justified by induction. But this is no more a problem than it is for other versions of induction,
where one assumes that observed situations are representative of all unobserved ones of the
same type in the universe. 
As we can see, assuming situated possibilities, there is a homogeneity between an induction
towards universal  regularities and an induction towards necessity:  both involve generalising
from a sample of situations to a larger set of the same type. One could reject the latter while
accepting the former assuming some disparities between the two cases: either merely possible
situations  do  not  exist  while  unobserved  actual  situations  do,  or  observed  situations  are
representative of unobserved actual ones, but not of merely possible ones. But assuming that
possible situations do exist (qua possible states of affairs), claiming that observed situations are
representative only of actual ones seems to be question-begging. Actual situations are merely a
sub-set of the possible situations: the ones that are realized. There seems to be no more reason to
assume a bias in the way these are selected among the larger set of possible situations than there
is to assume a bias in the way actually observed situations are selected among the larger set of
observable ones. 
The fact that, in this view, knowledge of necessity is arrived at by induction allows one to
defuse  a  lot  of  arguments  against  the  possibility  of  modal  knowledge.  Take,  for  example,
Hume’s  contention  that  no  necessary  connections  are  found  in  experience.  No  universal
regularity is found in experience either; yet universal regularities can be justified by induction,
so in our case, Hume’s argument against modal knowledge boils down to his argument against
induction in general. 
Another contention cited above is that possible worlds are causally disconnected from the
actual world: we have no “modal microscope” to observe mere possibilities. However, situated
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possibilities are not disconnected from actual situations in the same way possible worlds are.
Arguably, possible situations are among the possible effects of actual ones. And for this reason,
we possess a sure way to explore possible  types  of situations: all we have to do is implement
them through controlled interventions. If we want to know what would happen if a laser were
aimed at  a  reflecting  surface  at  an  angle  of  precisely  32  degrees,  all  we  have  to  do  is  to
implement the situation. And it will be representative of all exemplars of its type. 
One  could  argue that  once  the situation is  implemented,  it  becomes  actual  rather  than
merely possible, and more generally, that all situations that we will ever experience are actual,
so  that  we  never  have  knowledge  of  mere  possibilities.  But  the  same  problem  affects  an
extension to all actual situations: all situations we will ever experience are observed, so we have
no knowledge of unobserved ones. Yet we are generally willing to extend our knowledge of
observed phenomena to unobserved, but observable phenomena. This is nothing but ampliative
reasoning. So again, this type of argument affects any version of induction. 
Finally,  relations  of  necessity  have  been  considered  illegitimate  by  some  empiricists
because they are posited as explanations of empirical  regularities,  and inference to the best
explanation, as we have seen, is generally rejected by empiricists. This is not the case here:
relations of weak necessity are not explanations, but mere extensions of regularities to the realm
of possibilities. They are not arrived at by inference to the best explanation, but by induction.
Relations of weak necessity supervene on the mosaic of possible facts in the same way universal
generalisations supervene on the mosaic of actual facts. 
In  sum,  assuming that  there  are  situated  possibilities  in  the  world,  (weakly)  necessary
statements  are  in  the  same  boat  as  universal  generalisations  with  regards  to  epistemic
justification.  There  is  no  principled  obstacle  for  modal  knowledge  from the  perspective  of
someone who accepts the validity of induction. 
 5 Modal Underdetermination
So far,  I have argued that knowledge of weak necessity can be arrived at by induction.
However, one might remain a modal sceptic on the grounds that these relations of necessity are
strictly  stronger  than  universal  generalisation,  by  adopting  a  principle  of  metaphysical
parsimony. In this section, I wish to argue that it is actually irrational to refrain from accepting
induction  towards  necessity  once  induction  towards  universal  generalisation  is  accepted,
because no practical underdetermination could affect any relation of necessity without thereby
affecting the corresponding universal generalisation. This means that the former is as warranted
as the latter, from the same evidence and with the same inferential standards, at least once one
accepts that there are situated possibilities. 
My focus here is on contrastive underdetermination. Let us say that two statements are
underdetermined if they are  incompatible  (they cannot be both true), but no  observation can
help us decide which one is true (the range of relevant observations, for example, only past
observations, or all past, present and future observations, or all possible observations of actual
phenomena, will determine different kinds of underdetermination: one can set the bar at various
positions; my argument does not depend on a fixed choice in these matters, the point being that
any choice will result in necessary statements and universal generalisations falling on the same
side of it).  In the following,  I  will  only consider underdetermination of known hypotheses,
where all competing hypotheses must be confirmed by induction. This amounts to assuming that
it is rational to believe that a hypothesis that has no known competitors is true (we should not
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worry about unconceived alternatives, or even conceived ones when nothing confirms them).
This  is  quite  liberal,  but  I  think  this  liberal  attitude  is  acceptable  in  a  context  where  one
assumes, as suggested in a previous section, that our beliefs are defeasible. 
I consider that the statements that can be justified by induction are perfectly general: they
do not  refer  to specific objects,  and they are not  restricted to particular  places or times (in
logical parlance, they contain no proper names). They concern all situations of a certain type in
the universe. As an example, the law of optics that states that rays of light aiming at reflecting
surfaces from an angle are reflected at the same angle is general in this sense, because it does
not  mention  any  specific  reflecting  surface,  ray  of  light,  place  or  time  in  the  world:  it
supposedly applies to any such configuration, anywhere and at any time. 
Consider such a general statement of regularity  r0 and its modal counterpart  m0.  As an
example,  r0 could be the statement that all actual gold spheres of more than one kilometre in
diameter in the universe are stable, and m0 the statement that all possible gold spheres of more
than one kilometre in diameter are stable. Arguably,  m0 is strictly stronger than  r0 because it
quantifies over all possible situations. It would seem, then, that m0 could be underdetermined by
evidence when r0 is not. I wish to show that this kind of case is practically impossible (or more
precisely that it is impossible to know that we are in such a case), so that it can never be rational
to believe a universal generalisation while rejecting the corresponding relation of necessity. Let
us examine what it would look like. 
Concretely, this means that m0 could have a competitor that is as well-justified inductively,
call it m′0, so that it is impossible to decide which of m0 and m′0 is true on empirical grounds. m
′0 could  be,  for  example,  the  statement  that  all  possible  metal  spheres  of  more  than  one
kilometre in diameter are unstable, and it would be justified by observations of metal spheres
(excluding gold spheres), while the incompatible m0 would be justified by observations of gold
spheres. 
But  we  also  want  the  non-modal  statements  not  to  be  underdetermined.  If  r0 is  not
underdetermined,  then  r′0,  the  non-modal  counterpart  of  m′0,  must  not  be  a  legitimate
competitor of  r0. This can be the case either if  r′0 is not as well-justified as  r0, or if it is not
actually incompatible with r0. But there can be no reason that m′0 is justified by induction while
the weaker r′0 is not, so this must be because r0 and r′0 are not actually in conflict: both can be
true at the same time. How is this possible? Well, in our example, this is possible if there are no
gold spheres of more than one kilometre in diameter in the whole actual universe. Then it is true
that all actual gold spheres are stable (r0), and it is also true that all are unstable (r′0), because
there are none. The universal generalisations are not in conflict, but the corresponding modal
statements are, because we are not in a position to know whether such a gold sphere would be
stable or unstable if  it  existed.  So it  seems perfectly possible that  two modal  statements be
underdetermined while their non-modal counterparts are not. 
So far, modal scepticism seems vindicated: maybe metaphysical parsimony could enjoin us
to reject induction towards necessity, in particular if it were always possible to find competitors
to  modal  statements  that  are  not  in  competition  with  their  non-modal  counterparts  (which
remains to be shown). But let us examine this case more closely: how could we possibly know
that no big gold spheres exist in the whole universe? What if an alien civilisation in a remote
galaxy is creating big gold spheres? What if human scientists in the distant future attempt to
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create big gold spheres, just to know whether they are stable? What if they form naturally in
some places in the universe? Are there any reasons to exclude these possibilities? 
Call r1 the statement that no gold spheres exist in the universe, past present and future. Two
cases  should  be  distinguished.  Either  we  know  r1 by  induction,  or  we  know it  by  direct
observation. The latter case is implausible:  r1 is itself a universal generalisation (all situations
are such that there are no gold spheres), and there is no way we could observe all parcels in the
universe to make sure that no gold spheres exist. So we must have acquired this knowledge by
induction. But now consider  m1,  the modal equivalent of  r1,  that is,  the claim that big gold
spheres are impossible. If induction justifies r1, why couldn’t it justify m1? And if it does, then
we  have  no  underdetermination  of  the  modal  statements  after  all,  because  m0 and  m′0 are
actually compatible: all possible big gold spheres are stable, and all are also unstable, because
big gold spheres cannot possibly exist in our universe. 
What could compel us to assume that  r1 is justified, but not  m1, is if there could be an
underdetermination affecting  m1 but not  r1. But we can apply the same argument recursively,
and an infinite regress looms: we must assume that a statement m2 is underdetermined while a
statement r2 is not. Where will it stop? 
There are good reasons to think that it will stop at a point where neither mi nor ri can be
known to be true. In our example, I would argue that we reach this point at the first step: we
should not assume that there are no big gold spheres in the universe. But even if it doesn’t stop
there, it couldn’t go very far. 
Recall that induction requires extending a regularity in a sample of situations of a given
type to the set of all situations of the same type. The relevant type for r0∕s0 is, in our example,
situations with gold spheres with a diameter of more than one kilometre. r1∕s1 claim that there is
no situation of this type. Therefore the relevant type for  r1∕s1 must be a less specific type, a
“super-type”: it could be situations corresponding to gold spheres of any size (the claim being
that they are never bigger than one kilometre in diameter). If we lose specificity at each step in
the recursion, at some point, we will reach a completely unspecified type of situation (perhaps
something like: any chunk of matter). But the less specific the type of situation is, the more
various  its  exemplars  are,  and  the  less  representative  our  sample  can  be.  At  some  point,
induction cannot be vindicated at all (this can be shown in a Bayesian framework, assuming a
principle of indifference to fix prior probabilities for the conceivable states of a given type of
situation). Given the size of the universe, it’s very likely that many configurations of chunks of
matter that we never observe in our surroundings actually form somewhere, so not observing
them does not mean anything about whether they exist or not in the universe. This is a reason to
assume that there could be big gold spheres in the universe, even if we never observe them. 
So the regression must stop at a point where neither mi nor ri are known to be true, which
means that  both  mi-1 and  ri-1 are underdetermined,  and neither  is  known to be true,  which
means,  by recursion,  that  both  m0 and  r0 are  underdetermined.  In  other  words,  if  a  modal
statement is underdetermined, then its non-modal counterpart must be underdetermined as well.
The reason is the following: if there can be a possible situation where two necessary statements
are in conflict, then for all we know, this possible situation might as well be realized, hence the
two corresponding universal generalisations are in conflict as well. 
My  argument  rests  on  an  example  for  the  sake  of  presentation.  However,  it  can  be
generalised to any universal generalisation, in so far as we consider perfectly general statements
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(not restricted to particular places and times in the universe). The argument can be formalised as
follows: 
1. Hypothesis: we are justified in believing that at most one of two general statements  s
and s′ is true in all possible situations. However, we don’t know which is false (they are
underdetermined). 
2. Hypothesis: we are justified in believing, by induction, that s and s′ are true in all actual
situations (s is not a competitor of s′ for actual situations). 
3. If  at  most  one  of  s  and  s′  can  be  true  in  all  possible  situations,  then  they  make
incompatible  claims  for  at  least  one  type  of  situation,  and  this  type  has  possible
instances. 
4. If s and s′ are true in all actual situations, then any type of situation for which they make
incompatible claims has no actual instance. 
5. By 1,  2,  3 and 4, we are justified in believing (by induction and inference) that some
type of situation for which s and s′ make incompatible claims has possible instances, but
no actual instance. 
6. We cannot  be  justified in  believing,  by  induction and inference,  that  some type  of
situation has possible instances, but no actual instance. 
7. Contradiction (1, 2, 5, 6): the conjunction of hypotheses 1 and 2 is absurd. 
The argument rests on a few assumptions. Assumption  3 amounts to saying that the only
justification that at most one of two statements is true in all possible situations, when we don’t
know which is true or false, is that they make incompatible claims for at least one possible
situation. Indeed, such knowledge cannot be a posteriori (because we do not know which of the
statements are true or false), so it must be a priori, which means that these statements must be a
priori incompatible for some type of situation. However an a posteriori component remains (that
this  type  of  situation  must  be  possible),  and  this  is  what  drives  the  rest  of  the  argument.
Assumption 4 should be uncontroversial: incompatible claims cannot both be true. Step 5 rests
on the principle of transmission of epistemic justification by inference, and although there are
counterexamples to this principle (Wright, 1986), arguably, the present case is unproblematic. 
The crucial assumption is 6. Its justification is roughly the following: the claim that some
type of situation T has no actual instance can be translated into the claim that a statement s1 is
true of all actual situations of a less specific type. But s1 is justified by induction only if it has
no known competitors, and by recursively applying the same argument, we can show that this
entails that the claim that T has no possible instance is as well-justified, by the same standard. 
A direct consequence of the conclusion is the following: if we should believe in a universal
regularity because it has no known competitor (hyp. 2 is true), then the corresponding relation
of necessity has no known competitor (hyp.  1 is false), and we should also believe it, by the
same standard.
 6 Modal Conflicts in Scientific Practice
The argument outlined in the preceding section is rather abstract and formal, and one could
perhaps wonder if it is really relevant to real cases. I think it is. 
It is important to note that the argument has a normative flavour. It is an argument about
what  it  is  rational  to  believe.  The  point  is  not  about  whether  necessary  statements  can  be
absolutely underdetermined by all actual facts in the universe. The answer is: of course, this can
happen (for example if, actually, there are no big gold spheres in the universe). The point is
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about whether it can be rational, at some point in any enquiry, to assume that a weak necessary
statement is underdetermined while the corresponding universal generalisation is not. And the
answer is: no. 
Despite the rather formal nature of the argument, I think it is relevant for practical enquiry,
and for scientific practice in particular. 
For the purpose of illustration, imagine that two groups of scientists each believe in one of
our hypotheses about gold and metal spheres  s  and  s′  respectively: one group, specialised in
gold, has performed many tests on gold and has come to believe that all gold spheres are stable,
while the other, specialised in metal, has tested many different metals and believes that since
gold is a metal, some of the gold spheres (those that are big enough) are unstable. Would it be
rational, in these circumstances, to assume that  s  and  s′  are both true because they are both
justified  by  different  groups  of  scientists?  Would  it  be  rational  to  assume,  as  a  direct
consequence  of the conjunction of  s  and  s′,  that there are no big gold spheres in the whole
universe, even if no one ever attempted to justify that claim independently? This seems absurd.
Would it be rational to remain agnostic on whether possible big gold spheres are stable or not,
because we have no “modal microscopes” anyway? Should we stop our enquiry there? It seems
not. 
My intuition is that we could have been justified in believing either s or s′ in isolation. But
for the first  group of scientists,  the fact that  s′  is justified by another group constitutes new
evidence that s might not be true after all: it acts as a potential defeater of s; and the inverse is
true for the second group. The fact that they are  modal  competitors is enough to put them in
conflict. What is rational, in consequence, is to pursue our enquiry: someone should make the
relevant tests to know which of s or s′ is true. We should try to create big gold spheres. 
What if we discover, during the process, that gold spheres of one kilometre in diameter
cannot be created? Then the underdetermination is resolved: big gold spheres are both stable
and unstable because they cannot exist. And this resolves the modal underdetermination as well:
big gold spheres are impossible in this universe. 
What this example purports to show is that  in practice,  in science or elsewhere, modal
incompatibility is enough to create a conflict to be resolved. So making sure that a general
hypothesis is true involves eliminating all its known modal competitors,  which, incidentally,
resolves any modal underdetermination. And as a consequence, we have all reasons to accept
that all inductively justified knowledge has a modal force. 
Now there might  be some cases where we have good inductive reasons to believe that
particular types of situations are never instantiated in the whole universe. Arguably, this would
be  a  case  where  a  mere  possibility  is  underdetermined,  while  the  corresponding  universal
generality can be known. Imagine, for example,  that  there is not  enough gold in the whole
universe to ever form gold spheres of more than one kilometre in diameter. 
Is it enough to consider such cases to be a modal sceptic? 
A first problem with this strategy is that it could imply modal facts. In our example, we
could know that there is not enough gold in the universe because we know something about the
initial conditions of the universe, and we accept a principle of conservation of matter. But the
idea that the initial conditions of the universe, plus some law, constrain the kind of situations
there are now is modally loaded. Arguably, grounding modal scepticism on modal knowledge is
a bit problematic… 
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A second problem is that this  kind of case is  rather limited.  It  does not  warrant modal
scepticism in general, but only for specific cases, where we have information about some type
of situation that is never actually instantiated. 
And a third, fatal problem in our context is that these cases only exclude knowledge about
possibilities that  couldn’t even happen in our universe. This means that in the framework of
situated possibilities, they should be considered impossible. Remember that we are concerned
with  alternative  ways  actual,  bounded  situations  could  be,  given  some  fixed  background
conditions (and arguably,  the initial  conditions of the universe are part  of  these background
conditions). The alternatives to a situation are situations of the same type: they contain the same
objects, but these are configured differently. By this definition, if there is not enough gold in the
universe, then gold spheres of more than one kilometre in diameter are impossible, and whether
such gold spheres would be stable or not should not bother us: the notion of possibility involved
here is too metaphysical to ever be tested. 
But for all the more mundane hypotheses, that is, the ones that concern objects to which we
do have epistemic access,  there  is  no  real  problem.  If  a  general  hypothesis  has  no known
competitor, then it is legitimate to extend it to all possibilities. And if it turns out that it has a
modal competitor, then we should doubt this hypothesis and make relevant tests. In all cases, the
relation of necessity is as well-justified as the universal generalisation. 
 7 Law-like and Accidental Generalisations
Let me finish this article with a quick note about the epistemology of laws of nature. 
There is an ongoing debate about laws of nature between Humeans, who assume that laws
supervene  on  the  mosaic  of  actual  facts,  and  non-Humeans,  who  assume that  they  have  a
“modal force”, to which we could add anti-realists, who assume that there are no such things. 
One could say that the arguments put forward in this paper are in line with the views of
Humeans and anti-realists when it comes to scepticism about inference to the best explanation.
Law-like generalisations are merely the kind of statements that can be justified by induction; no
other mode of inference is needed. But my arguments fit with non-Humeanism when it comes to
the idea that law-like generalisations have a modal force. It  should be clear that there is no
contradiction here: law-like generalisations are exactly those that can be justified by induction,
and this means that they have modal force, because the corresponding law of (weak) necessity is
as well-justified. 
But one could worry that the present account cannot really distinguish law-like statements
from accidental generalisations, if both are equally well-justified by induction. Accounting for
this distinction is, after all, one of the main motives of the debate on laws of nature. 
Note, however, that the kind of relation of necessity considered in this paper does not fall
into the category of genuine laws of nature because it is relative to our epistemic position, and
to background conditions concerning, for example, the initial state of the universe (and the exact
conditions to which these relations of necessity are relative are presumably unknown).  This
means  that  the  kind  of  necessity  at  stake  is  more  permissive  than  nomic  necessity:  some
regularities might count as necessary in the framework of possible situations, even though they
would count as contingent from the perspective of a metaphysics of laws of nature. If, for some
contingent reasons, our observations were limited to the surface of earth, the idea that all objects
in  free  fall  accelerate  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth  at  9.8  m∕s2 would  count  as  weakly
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necessary (and arguably, it could have been considered as such some time ago!), although, as we
well know, it is not a universal law of nature. 
This  relative  permissiveness  can  defuse  the  problem  of  demarcating  accidental
generalisations from law-like generalisations. My take on this issue is similar to Goodman’s: I
would say that  identifying law-like statements is  only a matter  of  deciding which kinds of
statements are justified by induction and which are not. I assume that our capacity to imagine
legitimate modal competitors for the various hypotheses we could form, and our ability to test
them by implementing the relevant experimental situations, is enough to eliminate accidental
generalisations. So I might invent a contrived predicate by which I show, inductively, that all
coins in my pocket right now are 10 cent coins (with sufficient imagination, I might eliminate
any reference to particular places and times), and it looks as if I have inductively justified an
accidental generalisation to be a matter of necessity. But I can as easily justify the competing
statement that all coins in pockets in general are possibly mixed. This statement has far more
occurrences to make its case, and my first claim, with its tiny sample base, appears to be quite
weak in comparison. And I can easily defeat my first claim by running an experiment to test
which of the two competing hypotheses is true: simply by adding a 20 cent coin to my pocket. 
The idea is that most accidental generalisations could be eliminated, simply because they
would not survive the fierce competition to which a good enquiry would submit them. But in
virtue of the permissiveness mentioned above, some other cases, often given in the literature as
cases of accidental generalisations, could count as weak necessary connections in the present
framework: for example, it might well be  impossible for ducks to fly at more than 100 km∕h,
given some environmental constraints (although one might doubt that a statement about ducks is
perfectly general if it must refer to a particular common ancestry to understand what a duck is).
In sum, relaxing the metaphysical conditions for what counts as law-like generalisation, but
maintaining rather stringent epistemic criteria for what is inductively justified, can help make
sense of a meaningful distinction between accidental and law-like generalisation. 
The question remains why this statement about ducks, if it is law-like, does not derive from
or figure in any scientific theory, as opposed to the claim, of the same form, that no object
travels  faster  than light.  My answer  would be the following:  what  induction towards weak
necessity can justify is not fundamental scientific laws directly, but rather observational laws.
Fundamental  scientific  laws  are  fairly  idealised  and  rarely  directly  instantiated  in  our
observations (Cartwright, 1983; Giere, 1999). Perhaps they can be justified by a meta-induction
on observational laws, and then they might inherit  their modal force from the observational
laws, or perhaps they merely play a pragmatic, unifying role, without being strictly true. I won’t
commit myself on this issue. In any case, we seem to know a lot of law-like modal facts, about
the fragility of glass for example, without necessarily grounding this knowledge in fundamental
scientific theories, and this is what matters here: that these facts, with all their modal force, are
perfectly knowable from experience. 
 8 Conclusion
If one accepts that there are situated possibilities in the world, that is,  alternative ways
actual situations could be given some natural and environmental constraints, then there is an
inductive route towards knowledge of relations of necessity. Realized possibilities can be taken
to be representative of merely possible ones, and they inform us about what is possible or not in
this universe. The modality involved is weaker than metaphysical or nomic necessity, but that
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should  not  bother  us  for  all  practical  purposes.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  reason  to  resist
knowledge of weak necessity, because any underdetermination that would affect it, from our
perspective, would affect the corresponding universal generalisation just as much: if there is a
problematic possibility that contradicts a relation of necessity, for all we know, it might well be
realised somewhere in the universe. 
Given that the alleged impossibility of knowledge of relations of necessity from experience
remains one of the main reasons for modal scepticism, this means that there is no good reason
for an empiricist not to embrace natural modalities. 
References
   Armstrong, David (1983).  What is a Law of Nature?, volume 96. Cambridge University
Press. 
   Barwise, Jon and Perry, John (1983). Situations and Attitudes, volume 78. Mit Press. 
   Campbell, Scott (2001). Fixing a hole in the ground of induction. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 79(4), 553 – 563. 
   Cartwright, Nancy (1983).  How the Laws of Physics Lie, volume 34. Oxford University
Press. 
   Dretske, Fred I. (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science, 44(2), 248–268. 
   Foster,  John (1982). Induction, Explanation and Natural Necessity.  Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 83, 87–101. 
   French, Steven (2014). The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oup
Oxford. 
   Giere, Ronald N. (1999).  Science without laws. Science and its conceptual foundations.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
   Goodman, Nelson (1954).  Fact, Fiction & Forecast, volume 25. [London]University of
London. 
   Hale,  Bob  (2003).  Knowledge  of  Possibility  and  of  Necessity.  Proceedings  of  the
Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 103(1), 1–20. 
   Hawke, Peter (2011). Van Inwagen’s Modal Skepticism.  Philosophical Studies, 153 (3):
351--64.
   Kratzer, Angelika (2008). Situations in natural language semantics. In Angelika Kratzer,
editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
   Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. 
   Ladyman, James and Ross, Don (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.
Oxford University Press. 
   Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
   Nyrup, Rune (2015). How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: A Peircean View of
IBE. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 749–760. 
   Roca-Royes,  Sonia  (2017).  Similarity  and  Possibility:  An  Epistemology  of  de  Re
Possibility for Concrete Entities. In Modal Epistemology After Rationalism, pages 221–45. Bob
Fischer and Felipe Leon.
   Stove, David (1986). The Rationality of Induction, volume 23. Oxford University Press. 
   Strohminger,  Margot  (2015).  Perceptual  Knowledge  of  Nonactual  Possibilities.
Philosophical Perspectives, 29(1), 363–75. 
   van Fraassen, Bas (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press. 
16/17
   van Fraassen, Bas (1989). Laws and Symmetry, volume 102. Oxford University Press. 
   Williams, Donald Cary (1963). The Ground of Induction. New York, Russell & Russell. 
   Wright,  Crispin (1986).  Facts  and Certainty.  Proceedings of  the British Academy,  71,
429–472. 
   Wright, John (2018). An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism: Defending Realism
Without Inference to the Best Explanation. Springer International Publishing, Cham. 
17/17
